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The vulnerability was discovered in the course of an audit by SektionEins, a German security firm, and immediately reported to the Drupal Security Team. Because this was a pretty obscure vulnerability with no reported exploits, the team decided to wait until the first scheduled release date after DrupalCon Amsterdam to put out the notice and patch. Obviously, they knew that once word of the vulnerability was announced, there would immediately be a wave of exploits, so they imposed a blackout on any mention of it before October 15th. I think that they stuck to their word. Of course, attacks started a few hours after the announcement. Cary > On Oct 31, 2014, at 9:38 AM, Joe Hourcle <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > > On Oct 31, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Lin, Kun wrote: > >> Hi Cary, >> >> I don't know from whom. But for the heartbeat vulnerability earlier this year, they as well as some other big providers like Google and Amazon were notified and patched before it was announced. > > If they have an employee who contributes to the project, it's possible that this > was discussed on development lists before it was sent down to user level mailing > lists. > > Odds are, there's also some network of people who are willing to give things a > cursory review / beta test in a more controlled manner before they're officially > released (and might break thousands of websites). It would make sense that > companies who derive a good deal of their profits in supporting software would > participate in those programs, as well. > > I could see categorizing either of those as 'ahead of the *general* public', > which was Kun's assertion. > > -Joe > > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Code for Libraries [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Cary Gordon >> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 11:10 AM >> To: [log in to unmask] >> Subject: Re: [CODE4LIB] Terrible Drupal vulnerability >> >> How do they receive vulnerability report ahead of general public? From whom? >> >> Cary >> >> On Friday, October 31, 2014, Lin, Kun <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >>> If you are using drupal as main website, consider using Cloudflare Pro. >>> It's just $20 a month and worth it. They'll help block most attacks. >>> And they usually receive vulnerability report ahead of general public. >>> >>> Kun >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: Code for Libraries [mailto:[log in to unmask] >>> <javascript:;>] On Behalf Of Cary Gordon >>> Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 9:59 AM >>> To: [log in to unmask] <javascript:;> >>> Subject: Re: [CODE4LIB] Terrible Drupal vulnerability >>> >>> This is what I posted to the Drupal4Lib list: >>> >>> -------------------- >>> >>> By now, you should have seen https://www.drupal.org/PSA-2014-003 and >>> heard about the "Drupageddon" exploits. and you may be wondering if >>> you were vulnerable or iff you were hit by this, how you can tell and >>> what you should do. Drupageddon affects Drupal 7, Drupal 8 and, if you >>> use the DBTNG module, Drupal 6. >>> >>> The general recommendation is that if you do not know or are unsure of >>> your server's security and you did not either update to Drupal 7.32 or >>> apply the patch within a few hours of the notice, you should assume >>> that your site (and server) was hacked and you should restore >>> everything to a backup from before October 15th or earlier. If your >>> manage your server and you have any doubts about your file security, >>> you should restore that to a pre 10/15 image, as well or do a reinstall of your server software. >>> >>> I know this sounds drastic, and I know that not everyone will do that. >>> There are some tests you can run on your server, but they can only >>> verify the hacks that have been identified. >>> >>> At MPOW, we enforce file security on our production servers. Our >>> deployments are scripted in our continuous integration system, and >>> only that system can write files outside of the temporal file directory (e.g. >>> /sites/site-name/files). We also forbid executables in the temporal >>> file system. This prevents many exploits related to this issue. >>> >>> Of course, the attack itself is on the database, so even if the file >>> system is not compromised, the attacker could, for example, get admin >>> access to the site by creating an account, making it an admin, and >>> sending themselves a password. While they need a valid email address >>> to set the password, they would likely change that as soon as they were in. >>> >>> Some resources: >>> https://www.drupal.org/PSA-2014-003 >>> >>> https://www.acquia.com/blog/learning-hackers-week-after-drupal-sql-inj >>> ection-announcement >>> >>> http://drupal.stackexchange.com/questions/133996/drupal-sa-core-2014-0 >>> 05-how-to-tell-if-my-server-sites-were-compromised >>> >>> I won't attempt to outline every audit technique here, but if you have >>> any questions, please ask them. >>> >>> The takeaway from this incident, is that while Drupal has a great >>> security team and community, it is incumbent upon site owners and >>> admins to pay attention. Most Drupal security issues are only >>> exploitable by privileged users, and admins need to be careful and >>> read every security notice. If a vulnerability is publicly exploitable, you must take action immediately. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Cary >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 5:24 PM, Dan Scott <[log in to unmask] >>> <javascript:;>> wrote: >>> >>>> Via lwn.net, I came across https://www.drupal.org/PSA-2014-003 and >>>> my heart >>>> sank: >>>> >>>> """ >>>> Automated attacks began compromising Drupal 7 websites that were not >>>> patched or updated to Drupal 7.32 within hours of the announcement >>>> of >>>> SA-CORE-2014-005 >>>> - <https://www.drupal.org/SA-CORE-2014-005>Drupal >>>> <https://www.drupal.org/SA-CORE-2014-005> core - SQL injection >>>> <https://www.drupal.org/SA-CORE-2014-005>. You should proceed under >>>> the assumption that every Drupal 7 website was compromised unless >>>> updated or patched before Oct 15th, 11pm UTC, that is 7 hours after >>>> the >>> announcement. >>>> """ >>>> >>>> That's about as bad as it gets, folks. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Cary Gordon >>> The Cherry Hill Company >>> http://chillco.com >>> >> >> >> -- >> Cary Gordon >> The Cherry Hill Company >> http://chillco.com