The simplest thing to do (for a suitable definition of "simple") is,
rather than setting up a new IP range for the exit node, tell your
vendors to exclude the IP address of the exit node. Much like vendors
who don't allow off-campus access (*cough* uptodate) exclude the proxy
server address already.
On 2016-03-19 09:46 PM, William Denton wrote:
> On 19 March 2016, Alison Macrina wrote:
>> Hi all, Andromeda forwarded me this email and so I decided to join the
>> list in case anyone wants to chat about Tor relays (exits and non-exits)
>> in libraries.
> Welcome---I'm glad you joined.
> I work at a large university where the library has a small IT department
> and the university has a large one. University IT ultimately controls
> everything about networking and security. Library IT is concerned about
> security, and library administration is concerned about making sure our
> contracts with vendors aren't broken by us accidentally opening up JSTOR
> and PsycInfo to Tor users.
> How have academic libraries like mine been arranging exit nodes? Do you
> have any advice, regarding the technology and the advocacy, that would
> help? We tell vendors our IP range---how could I convince people to set
> up a new one for the exit node?